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Hate	crime	did	spike	after	the	referendum	–	even
allowing	for	other	factors
Did	hate	crime	spike	after	the	referendum?	While	there	is	no	doubt	the	number	of	reported	crimes
increased,	they	are	always	more	frequent	in	June	and	July	and	after	other	significant	events,	like
terror	attacks.	After	controlling	for	these	factors,	Daniel	Devine	(University	of
Southampton)	finds	the	referendum	was	associated	with	a	statistically	significant	rise	in	hate
crime.	But	how	much,	and	what	was	it	about	the	vote	that	had	such	a	powerful	effect?
Soon	after	the	Leave	vote,	the	United	Nations’	committee	on	the	elimination	of	racial
discrimination	argued	that	‘British	politicians	helped	fuel	a	steep	rise	in	racist	hate	crimes	during	and	after	the	EU
referendum	campaign’.	Conservative	Home	disagreed,	and	the	Daily	Mail	called	it	the	‘Great	Brexit	Hate	Crime
Myth’.	The	debate	did	not	go	away.	As	recently	as	October	2017,	Labour	MP	Stella	Creasy	claimed	there	was	‘no
doubt’	about	Brexit’s	impact,	and	German	newspaper	Deutsche	Welle	asked	if	the	UK’s	‘racist	hate	crime	problem	is
out	of	control’.
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Despite	this	huge	and	polarised	media	coverage	of	an	undeniably	important	topic,	there	was	little,	if	any,	rigorous
analysis	of	this	possibility.	As	The	Spectator	concluded:
Perhaps	the	referendum	did	lead	to	a	rise	in	hate	crime.	Then	again,	perhaps	it	didn’t.	But	despite	the
angry	reports	blaming	Brexit,	the	only	thing	that	is	clear	is	that	there	is	little	proof	either	way.
In	a	recent	working	paper,	I	have	sought	to	answer	precisely	this	question.	In	October	2017,	the	Home
Office	released	data	about	the	number	of	racial	and	religious	hate	crimes	in	England	and	Wales.	Exceptionally,	they
released	not	only	monthly	data	over	a	period	of	four	years	but	also	daily	data	over	nearly	two	years.	These	include
the	referendum,	but	also	significant	terror	attacks	on	UK	and	international	soil.	Because	of	the	length	of	the	time
covered	and	quality	of	data	available,	it	is	possible	to	control	for	the	random	fluctuations	and	wider	trends	of	hate
crime	and	get	close	to	a	causal	estimation	of	the	impact	of	the	referendum.
Brexit	and	hate	crimes
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Firstly,	Figures	1	and	2	show	the	trends	of	hate	crime	for	the	daily	and	monthly	data,	with	the	dashed	vertical	line
showing	when	the	referendum	occurred.	Figure	1	is	most	striking,	showing	the	sudden	increase	in	hate	crime	coming
soon	after	the	referendum	and	lasting	for	some	time	before	declining	back	to	(and	below)	pre-referendum	levels.
Towards	the	end	of	the	graph,	hate	crimes	increase	again	following	a	spate	of	terror	attacks	within	two	months	of
each	other:	Finsbury	Park	mosque,	London	Bridge,	Westminster	and	Manchester.	Again,	even	following	this,	hate
crimes	decline	soon	after.
Figure	1:	Daily	Hate	Crime
	
The	same	pattern	is	observed	in	the	monthly	data	in	Figure	2,	with	the	referendum	being	followed	by	a	large	spike	in
attacks.	Yet	the	graph	also	reveals	an	issue	highlighted	by	those	sceptical	of	the	impact	of	the	referendum:	hate
crimes	have	been	on	an	upward	trend	since	2013,	and	always	increase	a	lot	in	June	and	July	–	precisely	when	the
referendum	occurred.	Is	the	increase	in	2016,	then,	just	another	seasonal	increase	that	had	been	observed	before?
Figure	2:	Monthly	Hate	Crime
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To	study	this,	I	used	a	method	called	time	series	intervention	modelling,	which	allows	us	to	control	for	these	sorts	of
trends	as	well	as	all	other	identified	events	in	the	data.	I	therefore	controlled	for	all	plausible	events,	such	as	the
terror	attacks	mentioned	and	the	murder	of	Labour	MP	Jo	Cox	a	week	before	the	referendum.	Since	the	monthly
data	covers	such	a	long	period,	I	also	control	for	the	Paris	and	Charlie	Hebdo	attacks,	amongst	others.	Finally,	I	also
control	for	immigration	salience	using	Ipsos	Mori’s	‘issue	index’.	Even	accounting	for	these	other	events,	the	results
show	that	the	referendum	led	to	a	statistically	significant	increase	in	hate	crimes,	potentially	even	larger	than	the
Manchester	and	London	terror	attacks.	The	models	show	that	the	referendum	increased	hate	crimes	by	31	a	day,	or
638	in	a	month,	depending	which	data	is	used.	These	estimates	are	remarkably	robust	to	a	large	range	of	alternative
specifications,	and	only	loses	significant	if	we	believe	the	referendum	can	only	matter	in	the	three	days	following	the
vote.
But	why?	The	role	of	the	media	and	immigration
The	evidence	on	all	available	data	points	to	the	referendum	causing	a	significant	increase	in	hate	crimes.	But	there
remains	the	question	of	why.	Elections	and	referendums	happen	all	the	time	across	Europe	without	historically
remarkable	increases	in	race-hate	crime.	Whilst	it	isn’t	possible	to	offer	a	conclusive	answer	to	this	in	this	post,	there
is	a	potential	clue	in	the	dynamics	of	public	opinion,	media	coverage	and	hate	crimes.	Figure	3	shows	the	number	of
articles	in	UK	national	newspapers	containing	variations	of	the	words	“immigrants”	or	“migrants”	(dotted	line),	the
salience	of	immigration	(solid	line)	and	hate	crimes	(dashed	line),	for	each	month	in	2016.	These	values	are
standardised	to	fit	on	the	same	graph.
Figure	3:	Immigration	Salience,	Coverage	and	Hate	Crimes
LSE Brexit: Hate crime did spike after the referendum – even allowing for other factors Page 3 of 5
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-03-19
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/19/hate-crime-did-spike-after-the-referendum-even-allowing-for-other-factors/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
The	graph	has	an	interesting	pattern.	Both	salience	and	coverage	of	immigration	increase	before	the	referendum
(during	the	campaign)	and	peak	during	it.	Hate	crimes	follow	in	July,	peaking	about	a	week	after	the	referendum.	All
three	then	decline.	Since	we	know	the	media	has	a	potent	effect	on	anti-immigrant	attitudes	and	right-wing	party
support,	and	that	events	and	media	coverage	have	a	large	impact	on	hate	crimes,	it	is	not	implausible	that	this
dynamic	of	media	coverage	and	immigration	linked	the	referendum	with	hate	crime,	particularly	if	one	considers	the
dominance	of	immigration	and	immigrants	as	an	issue	during	the	campaign.	Similar	evidence	has	also	been	found
following	Donald	Trump’s	election	in	the	US.	The	subject	merits	further	research.	Since	the	data	used	does	not
include	hate	crimes	against	White	British	individuals	(though	this	is	still	classified	as	a	hate	crime),	we	can	be	sure	it
isn’t	a	‘backlash’	effect.
This	data	is	from	‘reported’	hate	crimes,	and	require	no	confirmation	(or	conviction).	There	is	still	an	argument	that	it
was	awareness	of	hate	crimes	and	increased	reporting	that	led	to	the	rise,	rather	than	actual	crimes.	This	cannot	be
ruled	out.	Yet,	it	would	also	mean	that	the	same	‘increased	reporting’	effect	existed	after	terror	attacks	and	happened
in	a	seasonal	trend.	Both	of	these	seem	unlikely,	given	the	evidence.
Conclusion
Many	of	the	arguments	against	putting	the	blame	at	the	referendum’s	door	rely	on	the	fact	that	hate	crimes	have
been	increasing	over	the	last	three	years,	and	always	peak	in	June	and	July.	However,	even	controlling	for	these	and
other	events,	the	evidence	strongly	supports	the	conclusion	that	the	referendum	led	to	an	increase	in	hate	crimes	–
potentially	even	more	than	the	terrorist	attacks	in	Manchester	and	London	did.	But	why?	What	was	it	about	the
referendum	as	an	event	(rather	than	the	campaign)	that	led	to	such	a	powerful	effect?	A	plausible	answer	lies	in	the
negative	framing	and	focus	of	immigrants	during	the	campaign,	which	came	to	a	head	during	the	referendum.
The	conclusion	that	the	referendum	led	to	such	a	large	increase	in	hate	crimes	should	be	concerning.	That	the	media
may	have	played	a	fundamental	role	in	linking	a	meaningful	democratic	event	with	prejudicial	violence	should	be
even	more	so.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Daniel	Devine	is	an	ESRC-funded	PhD	researcher	at	the	Department	of	Politics	and	International	Relations,
University	of	Southampton.
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